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Abstract: This paper considers how the growth in global consumption since the end 
of the Cold War, has impacted on the co-evolution of global inequality and poverty. It 
is often suggested that this era of growth has led to a dramatic reduction in global 
poverty and to the emergence of both a new global middle class and a more equal 
world. We argue that this dominant and optimistic narrative on globalisation since the 
Cold War is considerably more methodologically fragile than it at first seems. Further, 
we suggest that this has implications for the UN goal to end global poverty by 2030. 
The fall in inequality is almost exclusively attributable to the effect that the rise of 
China has had on between-country inequality. Changes in global inequality across the 
rest of the world are much more modest. Much heralded falls in global poverty have 
raised the consumption of the poorest, but the extent to which that is the case depends 
on where one draws the global poverty line as at the lower end of the global 
distribution a change of just 10c can remove 100 million people from global poverty 
headcounts. If one takes instead the average poverty line for all countries (a more 
genuinely global poverty line) of $5 per day poverty headcounts have hardly changed 
since the Cold War. Meanwhile, the numbers living at risk of sliding back into 
poverty (between $1.90 and $10 a day) grew by 1.6bn, compared to a rise of 1.1bn in 
the numbers living above this level, and around half of those living above this level 
saw their share of global consumption fall. We suggest therefore that the dominant or 
optimistic narrative, of falling poverty and an emerging ‘middle class’ largely free 
from the threat of poverty, disguises both considerable growth in the size of the 
‘global precariat’ living in conditions that most in the developed world would 
consider to be well below ‘middle class’ and an erosion of the financial security of a 
significant proportion of those living at higher consumption levels. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
What has happened to global inequality and global poverty since the ‘end of history’, 
meaning the end of Cold War? Based on how the headlines of reports from 
international agencies are reproduced and re-presented in the media, a dominant 
narrative can be identified as percolating into received wisdom on development policy 
discourse. This is an optimist’s narrative which can be summed up as suggesting that 
global inequality and global poverty have fallen substantially since the end of the 
Cold War in the late 1980s. Central to this narrative is the argument that the 
globalised spread of prosperity in the post-Cold War era has led to rapidly falling 
poverty, an evolution towards a more equal world and the emergence of a new global 
middle class. In this paper it is argued that this narrative on the contemporary era of 
globalization is considerably more methodologically fragile than it at first seems. This 
is significant because this dominant and optimistic narrative suggests that falling 
global poverty and inequality, and the rise of a global middle secure from poverty and 
willing and able to consume more, are a direct consequence of liberal market-oriented 
policies and therefore that governments need primarily to focus on economic growth 
and integration into the global economy and not be too much concerned with 
redistribution. The purpose of this paper is to test how robust that narrative is. Of 
course in reality, many in international agencies have taken a more nuanced view of 
progress. We would thus note at the very outset that our characterization of the 
dominant narrative is stylized and should not be taken as absolute. We note that many 
others, including authors of numerous international reports such as the annual MDG 
monitoring reports, have recognized both that China explains much of the global 
progress on poverty and that the distribution of the benefits of global growth has been 
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very uneven both between and within countries. Of course, notwithstanding this 
unequal distribution, any progress in raising the consumption of the poorest is to be 
welcomed, however modest it may be. But, there is a danger that developing a 
narrative predominantly around what is happening to the poorest of the poor in global 
society risks marginalising, and even losing sight of, what may be a much less 
optimistic story if one considers what is happening when one looks at the global 
distribution in its entirety, and particularly among those who while not the very 
poorest are still very poor. The new SDG agenda also motivates such concerns by 
placing issues of inequality much more centrally on the global agenda. 
In this paper we consider the robustness of the dominant narrative by 
presenting new, alternative estimates of the evolution of global inequality and global 
poverty. By exploring who have been the relative winners and losers from global 
growth since the end of the Cold War, we argue that global inequality and global 
poverty have changed rather less than the dominant narrative would suggest. The 
impression, that because global inequality is falling it is not necessary to be unduly 
concerned about redistribution, is misleading. This is because most of the global fall 
is due solely to the impact of the rise in average per-capita consumption in China on 
global between-country inequality. Beyond this effect, remarkably little improvement 
has been made to global inequality despite global consumption increasing by over 
85% (in PPP terms) 2  from 1990 to 2012. One implication of this is that, 
notwithstanding,  there has been a substantial (1.1bn) rise in the number of people 
living at consumption levels where they might be considered to form a global ‘middle’ 
not at risk of sliding back into poverty. The largest rise (1.6bn people) has occurred in 
                                                        
2 The analysis rebases national account data (as used in World Development Indicators, for example) to 
make it compatible with survey data (as used in World Bank, 2015, for example). 
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the group of people who whilst not below the extreme poverty line are nevertheless 
either very poor or still precariously at risk of sliding back into poverty.  
 The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3discuss respectively, trends 
in global inequality and global poverty since the Cold War. Section 4 concludes. The 
methodological approach is discussed in detail in the Annex. 
 
2 GLOBAL INEQUALITY 
 
To illustrate what is happening with global consumption inequality we provide here 
both Gini and Theil index estimates for the period from 1990 to 2012. In each case, 
we calculate the inequality between individuals (as per Milanovic, 2012), both with 
and without the top incomes adjustment described above. We also calculate separately 
inequality between countries and inequality within countries (population-weighted in 
both cases). The Gini index is the more widely used measure of inequality largely 
because of its close and relatively intuitive association with the Lorenz curve, 
however it is not readily decomposable (i.e. there is an interaction term between the 
within-country and between-country effects so that two estimates are not fully 
independent of each other). 3  The less commonly used Theil index is fully 
decomposable and so may be more relevant when comparing within-country and 
between-country effects. Furthermore, whereas the Gini index is more sensitive to 
changes in the middle of the distribution the Theil index is more sensitive to changes 
at the extremes (see for full discussion, Cowell, 2000).    
                                                        
3 Methods to approximately decompose the Gini into additively separable components do exist but it is 
not a simple procedure and they are not widely used (see Pyatt, 1976; Araar, 2006). 
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Figure 1: Global Gini coefficient (with and without top income adjustment), 1990-
2012  
Source: GrIP v2.0 
Figure 2: Global Gini coefficient excluding China (with and without top income 
adjustment), 1990-2012 
Source: GrIP v2.0 
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Figure 3: Global Theil coefficient (with and without top income adjustment), 1990-
2012  
Source: GrIP v2.0 
Figure 4: Global Theil coefficient excluding China (with and without top income 
adjustment), 1990-2012 
Source: GrIP v2.0 
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Figure 1 shows the global Gini indices. In view of the widely recognised dominance 
of China in the changing global growth, inequality and poverty situation, Figure 2 
shows the Gini indices for the world excluding China. Figures 3 and 4 present the 
relevant Theil indices. 
Between 1990 and 2000, global consumption inequality between individuals 
hardly changed, but from 2000 to 2012 it did start to fall. The effect is most 
pronounced in the Theil indices where inequality between individuals was 77% of its 
2000 value. These falls are, however, solely due to changes in between-country 
inequality. Within-country inequality stayed effectively the same in 2012 as it was in 
20004, and perhaps even slightly higher than in 1990, whilst the between-country 
Theil index fell to 67% of its 2000 value. As a result, and based on the Theil indices, 
whereas  in 1990 between-country inequality accounted for 64% of global inequality, 
but 2012 this figure had fallen to 55%. 
 The dominance of China here is clearly illustrated. Inequality between 
individuals has fallen since 2000 across the rest of the world but the effect is more 
modest. In 2012 the between-individuals Theil, excluding China, was 86% of its 2000 
value. However, rising between-country inequality (excluding China) from 1990 to 
2000 meant that this was only slightly lower than (93% of) 1990 values. Again, most 
of the fall since 2000 was due to changes in between-country inequality. Within-
country inequality was little changed in 2012 being just slightly lower (94%) than it 
was in 2000. So, while in 1990 between-country inequality accounted for 60% of 
global inequality, when China is excluded, by 2012 this share had probably fallen, but 
only very slightly to 58%. 
                                                        
4 This does not mean that there have been no changes in inequality within individual countries, merely 
that as some countries have become more unequal others have become less so with the result that at the 
aggregate level little has changed. 
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3. GLOBAL POVERTY 
 
It was much heralded in the run up to the 2015 end-date for the Millennium 
Development Goals that substantial progress had been made in reducing global 
extreme poverty. The GrIP (‘Gr’owth, ‘I’nequality and ‘P’overty model version 2.0; 
see Annex) analysis confirms that this is indeed the case with headcounts below the 
new $1.90-a-day extreme poverty line falling by more than half, from 1.8bn in 1990 
to 860mn in 2012. Yet again though the rapid rise of China has been a dominant 
effect. In the rest of the world extreme poverty fell by just 28%, from 1.1bn to 790mn, 
meaning that over 90% of global extreme poverty is now outside China. 
 Recalling that the $1.90 poverty line is measured in Purchasing Power Parity 
dollars, it is worth observing that this represents a level of consumption that most 
people would consider to be closer to destitution than a reasonable subsistence 
consumption level. For most people living at this level the difference between living 
just 10cents below or 10cents above this level could hardly be considered to represent 
a substantively different quality of life. Nevertheless it is by crossing this threshold 
that people are no longer deemed to be in extreme poverty. 
Figure 5 demonstrates just how sensitive global poverty headcounts are to the 
choice of poverty line. The $1.90 a day line is set at a level where the greatest density 
of the world’s population live. In this region a difference of just 10cents in the 
poverty line can add or subtract almost 100mn people to global poverty headcounts. 
With poverty lines in this region, very modest changes in the poverty line, or in the 
survey and consumption data on which analyses of poverty headcounts are built, can 
make very substantial differences to calculated poverty headcounts. It is only when 
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poverty lines increase to around $5 that this sensitivity to measurement and 
assumption differences starts to reduce significantly. 
 
Figure 5: Sensitivity of global poverty headcount, 2012, $0-$10 per day  
Source: GrIP v2.0 
 
This is not merely an intriguing statistical issue. The poverty line one adopts makes a 
substantial difference not only to the level and trend of global poverty observed but 
also influences policy makers’ and activists’ understanding of both where the world’s 
‘deserving’ poor actually live and the scale of the challenge (in terms of the value of 
the poverty gap) of ending poverty. 5  
 What then would be a reasonable global poverty line? The ‘official’ global 
poverty line has recently been rebased to $1.90 in 2011PPP from $1.25 in 2005PPP 
                                                        
5 Edward and Sumner (2015) discuss these matters originally raised in Deaton (2010), in more depth. 
In short, lower poverty lines ‘push’ global poverty into sub-Saharan Africa and slightly higher lines 
‘Asianise’ global poverty.  
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(Ferreira et al., 2015; Jolliffe and Prydz, 2015). While the logic of this is open to 
contention, as in previous adjustments (see Lahoti and Reddy, 2015 and the historic, 
Ravallion, 2002, 2008; Reddy and Pogge, 2002, 2005), the new line does have one 
underlying rationale in that it is the median of the national poverty lines in the world’s 
low income countries (rather than merely the 15 countries that were used to estimate 
the earlier $1.25 line). There is though still an arbitrary element here, because the 
group of LICs is still arbitrary to some extent although not totally without logic (see 
Sumner, 2016 for discussion). Jolliffe and Prydz (2016) provide an interesting 
discussion of the critiques of the international poverty line and propose a new dataset 
of estimates for national poverty lines in 2011PPP by inferring national poverty lines 
from the poverty rate to estimate national poverty lines. They note (p. 4) that the 
average poverty line produced from the set of 15 national poverty lines of the poorest 
countries is very sensitive to quality of inflation data. Mali, for example, requires 22 
years of CPI data to estimate its poverty line in 2011 and in three of the 15 countries 
(Ghana, Malawi and Tajikistan), the CPI data was thought to be so questionable that 
household survey data was used to construct a temporal deflator. If CPI in World 
Development Indicators had been used for those three countries it would have added 
20 cents to the international poverty line and 200mn poor to global poverty counts. 
 An alternative to the $1.90 poverty line would be a set of lines (as Jolliffe and 
Prydz, 2016 propose). Candidates for higher lines would be $2.50, $5 and $10. The 
first of these, $2.50 is approximately 50 per cent of global median consumption in 
2012 and generates a comparable headcount to estimates of multi-dimensional 
poverty (1.6bn in 2010, see Alkire et al., 2014), although we note that the multi-
dimensional poor and the monetary poor are not necessarily the same 1.6bn people. 
Alkire et al. (2014) review numerous studies and argue that the monetary poor and the 
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multidimensional poor are not synonymous. A further limitation of the $2.50 line is 
that it is still in the region where poverty headcounts show maximum sensitivity to 
assumptions and measurement errors (cf. Figure 5). A $2.50 line is an approximation 
of the average poverty lines of all developing countries (see discussion in Hoy and 
Sumner, 2016). The median poverty line of all developing countries in the Jolliffe and 
Prydz (2016) dataset is $2.79 and population weighted mean is $2.46. Raising the 
$1.90 line to $2.50 or even $2.80 would add 600m-900m people. In short it could 
double the global poverty headcount. 
 Another possibility would be to take a poverty line of $5 on the basis that it is 
both the average value of national poverty lines in all countries (see Jolliffe and Prydz, 
2016) and close to global median consumption in 2012 (i.e. the level below which the 
poorer half of the world’s population live). This would move the poverty line to a 
region much less sensitive to assumptions and measurement errors thereby making it 
a more reliable indicator of real progress in global well-being. Both this line and the 
$2.5 line also open the possibility that rather than measuring poverty in terms of 
headcounts it might be better to measure changes in median consumption because 
these are more ‘distribution aware’ indicators of development progress (see for 
discussion, Birdsall and Meyer, 2014)  
 A further possibility might be the substantially higher line of $10-a-day that is 
associated with a permanent escape from poverty in longitudinal studies of Brazil, 
Mexico and Chile (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014) and Indonesia (Sumner et al., 
2014). The $10 poverty line is a proposal for a ‘security from poverty’ consumption 
line developed and used by López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2014) based on the 10% 
probability of falling back below national poverty lines (which are $4-$5/day in 
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2005PPP) in the near future in Mexico, Brazil and Chile.6 To put some additional 
context on this, just 11% of OECD population and 8% of G7 population lives below 
this $10 a day level. 
 Global poverty levels at each of these four poverty lines ($1.90, $2.50, $5 and 
$10) are presented as percentages of global population in Figures 6 and 7 (with and 
without China respectively) and as absolute numbers (millions) in Figures 8 and 9. 
How robust and significant one considers the fall in global poverty to be 
depends on what line one uses, whether it includes China or not, and whether one 
considers proportion of population or total number of poor people. Figures 6 and 7 
show that the falls in poverty tend to be more substantial as the poverty line falls. For 
example, at $10 per day the fall in global poverty is just 10 percent over the period, 
falling from about 80 per cent of the world’s population to about 70 per cent. If one 
excludes China, $10 poverty is about the same proportion of population in 2012 as it 
was in 1990. However, at $1.90 or $2.50 the fall is more substantial, respectively 
from 35 percent and 45 per cent of world population in 1990 to just over 10 and 20 
per cent in 2012. Again, without China the falls are much less impressive. 
 When one considers actual absolute numbers of people by each line, the 
record on poverty reduction further weakens drastically. Figures 8 and 9 show that 
even including China, $10 poverty has risen from 4 billion people to close to 5 billion 
people while $5 poverty is about the same as it was in 1990 (3.4bn in 1990, 3.2bn in 
2012). Poverty at the two lowest lines has fallen more convincingly if one includes 
China. However, once again the exclusion of China reveals patterns counter to the 
dominant narrative. For example, at the new global poverty line of $1.90 poverty has 
                                                        
6 The 10% probability line is actually $8.50-$9.70 depending on whether Brazil, Mexico or Chile are 
used (and comparable estimates for Indonesia are $8.37 for a $4 national poverty line and $13.03 at $5, 
in 2005 PPP - see Sumner et al., 2014). Thus, the mean is $9.27 and if the mean is inflated to 2011 
prices it is $10.47. 
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fallen from just over 1 billion people to just under one billion but at a slightly higher 
line which is the median for all developing countries, $2.5 per day poverty only fell 
below 1990 levels in 2010 and is now only slightly below those levels. 
 If one were to consider that the definition of being ‘middle class’ is to be 
sufficiently well off that you are secure from the risk of sliding into poverty (and 
assume that that is achieved at consumption levels above $10 a day) then since 1990 
an additional 1.1bn people have been added to this group, so there certainly has been 
a significant increase in the size of the global ‘middle class’. However, in the same 
time the number living above the extreme ($1.9) poverty line but below the ($10) 
secure-from-poverty line has increased by 1.6bn. This group would include many 
people one might consider to still be very be poor (living only a little above the 
extreme poverty line) plus those living precariously at risk of sliding back into 
poverty. Arguably, this represents a significant challenge to the dominant narrative.  
The total poverty gap gives a consistent picture to the above discussion (see 
Figures 10 and 11). The global poverty gap at $10 rose over the last two decades but 
is now back to the point it was in 1990. At $5 per day the total poverty gap fell by 
approximately a third in value. The fall in the value of the total poverty gap at the 
lower lines are more substantial: at $1.90 and $2.50 per day the total poverty gap fell 
in 2012 respectively to 38 per cent and 47 per cent of its value in 1990 ($424bn to 
$164bn at $1.90 and $888bn to $417bn at $2.50). However, when China is excluded 
the $10 poverty gap has risen from $7150bn in 1990 to $8383bn in 2012. And the 
total poverty gap excluding China at the $5 poverty line is about the same level as 
1990 but the total poverty gap excluding China at $1.90 and $2.50 has fallen from 
$258bn to $155bn and from $549bn to $385bn respectively. 
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Figure 6: Global poverty headcount (% of population), 1990-2012 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
Figure 7: Global poverty headcount (% of population) excluding China, 1990-2012 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
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Figure 8: Global poverty headcount (millions), 1990-2012 
Source: GrIP v2.0 
Figure 9: Global poverty headcount (millions) excluding China, 1990-2012 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
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Figure 10: Global poverty gap, 1990-2012 (US$bn, 2011 PPP) 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
 
Figure 11: Global poverty gap, excluding China, 1990-2012 (US$bn, 2011 PPP) 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0   
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By focusing rather narrowly on the global success at reducing poverty against the 
very low extreme poverty line and on the success at lifting many people into a 
condition where they are newly secure from poverty, the dominant narrative rather 
obscures that in terms of absolute numbers the biggest change globally has been the 
increase in the size of the global poor and ‘precariat’ living between $1.90 and $10 a 
day. 7   
We should make clear that we are not dismissive of the progress that evidently 
has been made in terms of lowering poverty at the extreme, as well as at the $2.50 
poverty lines (including when excluding China). Rather we are noting that the decline 
is of course welcome but really rather modest. The real contention is of course 
whether anyone can live on $1.90 and if that does provide the capacity to purchase 
minimum food requirements. Because the global population is very dense at around 
that level, the fact that the use of official inflation data would raise this minimum 
poverty line only slightly but would add 200m people to the poor count is in itself 
sobering. In short, we are not saying the world should not care about the poorest. We 
are saying the world is not even counting some of the poorest.  
In sum, we have argued thus far that changes in global inequality are modest 
and largely due to between, not within, country effects, and that the between-country 
changes are so dominated by China’s rise that the fall in global inequality largely 
evaporates once China is excluded from analysis. We also find that very low poverty 
lines (such as $1.90 a day) are so hypersensitive to small differences in the data that 
they create the impression that progress in the global battle against poverty has been 
more significant than it appears when poverty lines that are both more globally 
representative and less sensitive to measurement errors (such as $5 a day) are applied. 
                                                        
7 We take the term ‘precariat’ here from Standing (2011). 
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And we suggest that, far from witnessing the simplistic emergence of a new ‘middle 
class’, most of the world’s burgeoning middle is highly precarious in the sense that 
they live a considerable distance away from the consumption levels associated with 
permanent escape from poverty in longitudinal surveys in developing countries. 
 
The global distribution curve 
 
This implies that, rather than focusing on overall economic growth and extreme 
poverty headcounts, closer attention needs to be paid the distribution of the benefits of 
growth. Figures 10 to 12 present global density curves that illustrate the distribution 
of population (plotted positively on the y-axis) and consumption (plotted negatively 
on the y-axis) across the full range of global consumption. Areas beneath curves are 
standardised relative to the 2012 population and consumption totals, respectively. 
This means that the change in area (between each curve and the x-axis) between 1990 
and 2012 (say) is proportional to the change in the number of people living at any 
particular consumption level (above the x-axis) or to the change aggregate 
consumption of the people living at a particular consumption level (below the x-axis). 
Figure 10 presents the figures without the top incomes adjustment. Figure 11 includes 
the top incomes adjustment.  
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Figure 10: Global density curves, 1990, 2000 and 2012 without top income 
adjustment 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
 
Figure 11: Global density curves, 1990, 2000 and 2012 with top income adjustment 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
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What can be clearly seen is the growth in the global middle, evidenced by the filling 
out of the concavity in the population curve above $2.5 a day since 1990. This 
concavity, which was even deeper in the 1980s, led Quah (1996) to describe us as 
living in a ‘twin-peak’ world. It remains to be seen, however, whether the current 
situation represents a permanent end to that twin-peak rich-poor divide or whether it 
indicates merely a transition to the emergence of a new divide. For example, the 
incipient return of the concavity between $5 and $10 a day when top incomes are 
added in might be a precursor of the return of such a divide. It is notable also that 
when China is removed (Figure 12) the concavity persists still in 2012, indicating that 
its current absence at the global level may merely be evidence of China’s progression 
from the lower under-developed peak to a higher-developed location rather than an 
indicator of any more fundamental changes in the fairness of the global economy. 
 
Figure 12: Global density curves (excluding China), 1990, 2000 and 2012 without top 
income adjustment 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0  
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The curves also clearly illustrate who benefitted most from global consumption 
growth. Between 1990 and 2012 global consumption increased by 90%, with most of 
that growth occurring after 2000; reminding us that despite the financial crisis of the 
late 2000s the world is still consuming a lot more now than it was at the end of the 
Cold War. Of that growth, four-fifths went to those who in 2012 were consuming 
more than $10 a day. The remaining one-fifth (the figure falls to 15% if top incomes 
are included) went to the more than two-thirds of the world’s population who exist 
precariously on less than $10 a day. 
 Growth incidence curves provide further insight into the winners and losers 
from global growth since 1990. Figure 13 shows how people across the global 
consumption spectrum (from the poorest to the richest fractiles) have benefited in 
relative terms (i.e. percentage change in consumption from 1990 levels). Again the 
dominance of China is starkly revealed. With China included, people living in 2012 
on between $2.5 and $10 a day had typically seen their per capita consumption levels 
rise, in percentage terms, by twice the global average or more. However, once China 
is removed the picture becomes very different with those living on less than $5 a day 
seeing their relative consumption rise much less, albeit nevertheless broadly in line 
with the global average (in percentage terms). Typically, most of those on higher 
consumption levels have seen their relative consumption rise more slowly than the 
global average so that in relative terms it is both the global precariat (those between 
$1.90 and $10 a day) and most of what might be called the ‘securiat’ (those above $10 
a day with the possible exclusion of the very richest fractile) who have seen their 
consumption rise more slowly than global averages. 
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Figure 13: Growth incidence curve (relative benefits), with and without top incomes 
adjustment, 1990-2012  
 
 
Source: GrIP v2.0.  
Note: fractile locations of $-a-day lines are based on world without top income adjustment. 
 
 
Figure 14: Growth incidence curve (absolute benefits), with and without top incomes 
adjustment, 1990-2012  
 
Source: GrIP v2.0.  
Note: fractile locations of $-a-day lines are based on world without top income adjustment. 
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In this (relative) sense the distribution of global growth since 1990 could be seen as 
having been generally pro-poor, even when China is excluded. However it must be 
remembered that these relative consumption rises represent percentage changes on 
already very low consumption levels. When absolute consumption levels are 
considered the picture is, of course, very different (Figure 14). Here it is the richest 
40% who have seen their per capita consumption rise, in $-value, by more than the 
global average. And if China is removed it is only the richest 10% who have 
benefitted by more than the global average.  
 Overall then, analysis of the distribution of the absolute benefits of global 
growth hardly seems to point to the emergence, within developing economies, of a 
burgeoning ‘middle class’. Certainly, there has been a significant growth (1.1bn) in 
the number living secure from sliding back into poverty. There are now 2.2bn people 
in this ‘global securiat’ living above the $10 a day level. The 400mn of them who live 
in China have benefitted enormously, as have the 700mn who constitute the world’s 
richest decile. But the remaining 1.1bn of them have seen their consumption grow in 
absolute terms by less than the global average and in relative terms by much less than 
(around 50% of) the global average since 1990.  
In sum, contrary to the dominant narrative, therefore, far from witnessing a 
simplistic end to poverty and the rise of a global ‘middle class’ we may well be 
witnessing something much more complex. A key dynamic is, unsurprisingly, the 
rapid transition of China on a trajectory to becoming a highly developed economy. 
This ‘success story’ however can mask the fact that since 1990 the largest change in 
headcounts has been in the number of people globally living either in poverty, albeit 
not extreme poverty, or at risk of sliding back into poverty. Almost 80% of people in 
this group live outside China but the precarious nature of their existence is largely 
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absent from the dominant narrative. And at higher consumption levels, among those 
secure from poverty, there is evidence that, other than for the world’s top decile and 
for the 400mn people in China who are newly above the $10 a day consumption level, 
the distribution of global growth since 1990 has seen them benefit by less than global 
averages in both absolute and relative terms.  
Overall then, once the ‘China effect’ is carefully disaggregated from the 
analysis, what emerges is a picture of a world in which remarkably little has changed 
in terms of global inequality. Meanwhile, much heralded falls in extreme poverty 
seem both to overstate the world’s success in addressing global poverty, broadly 
defined, and to be rather unreliable due to their sensitivity to measurement and 
assumption differences. This risks obscuring the very significant increase in the 
number of people in the world who, while above the extreme poverty line, are either 
still poor or at risk of sliding back into poverty. At higher consumption levels, among 
those living more securely (the ‘global securiat’ above $10 a day) around half of them, 
those in the global top decile and those now living in China on more than $10 a day, 
have seen their consumption rise, in absolute terms, well above global averages. But 
for the rest of the ‘global securiat,’ on average they have seen their share of global 
consumption eroded both in absolute and relative terms. The dominant narrative 
therefore risks obscuring a far less promising picture, of a burgeoning global middle 
where well-being and financial security seem precarious or increasingly insecure. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In conclusion, we can make three observations on how global inequality and global 
poverty have changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a much heralded fall in 
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global inequality is largely explicable with reference to the impact of China’s rise on 
between-country inequality. When China is excluded, changes in aggregate inequality 
across the world are much more modest with inequality levels in 2012 being 
marginally lower than in 1990. Throughout this entire period within-country 
inequality has, overall, been remarkably constant – as some countries have become 
less equal, others have become more so. In short, in the last 25 years, falls in total 
global inequality, and in global between-country inequality are almost all attributable 
to rising prosperity in China. 
 Second, while it is the case that falls in global poverty look impressive at 
$1.90 or $2.50 those falls look fall less convincing at $5 and $10. And even the falls 
at the lower poverty lines start to look unimpressive if one looks at the rest of the 
world outside China and considers absolute numbers of people under each line. In any 
event, the fact that global poverty counts are so hypersensitive at the lower poverty 
lines ought to be reason enough to use higher lines that are less sensitive to 
measurement errors and differences in analysis assumptions. To reiterate we are not 
dismissing the raising of the consumption of the very poorest. Rather we are noting 
that progress is rather modest and that the lowest poverty lines actually cut off some 
of the poorest whose consumption may be just a few cents higher than these extreme 
levels. We note also that the global poverty line ought to be 20 cents higher if national 
CPI data were used, or even 60 cents or 90 cents higher if one took the estimated 
value of the average poverty line of all developing countries. We would thus argue 
that multiple poverty lines are more useful than fixating excessively on the $1.90, and 
especially so given that recent reductions in the number of extreme poor arise because 
a large number of people have merely moved from just below that line to just above it. 
Whether they are still ‘poor’ depends on whether one accepts that someone can live 
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on the average poverty line of the world’s 15 poorest countries in 2005, with those 
national poverty lines adjusted by national inflation, minus 20 cents (due to the three 
countries where CPI data is too poor to use). Higher lines would be better in the sense 
of generating poverty counts that are less hyper-sensitive to small variations in the 
value of the line, although only when those poverty lines have the logic of being the 
average for all countries (a truly global poverty line) or the consumption needed to 
permanently escape poverty. We are not saying higher poverty lines are better for the 
sake of it but rather that higher poverty lines that have a conceptual logic would seem 
to be stronger proxies for global poverty. 
Finally, certainly the twin peak world of the 1980s has softened and a new 
middle has emerged. However, this does not seem to herald the arrival of a global 
middle class safe from poverty. Global growth has increased the numbers of people 
living above a consumption line associated with permanent escape from poverty, but 
the largest increase in numbers has been in the burgeoning precariat who live above 
the lower poverty lines of $1.90 or $2.50 per day but still a long distance from a 
consumption line associated with security from falling back in to poverty in the future 
of $10 per day. And among those at higher consumption levels, other than for the 
newly rich in China and the world’s richest decile, most of these people have seen 
their financial security eroded. 
In sum, we would argue that the narrative that economic growth since the 
Cold War has led to a new age of falling global inequality and poverty is considerably 
more fragile than it at first seems. We suggest instead that the dominant narrative, of 
falling poverty and an emerging ‘middle class’ largely free from the threat of poverty, 
disguises both considerable growth in the size of the ‘global precariat’ living in 
conditions that most in the developed world would consider to be well below ‘middle 
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class’, and an erosion of the financial security of a significant proportion of those 
living at higher consumption levels. Both the exclusion of China and the adoption of 
less extreme (and less hypersensitive) poverty lines reveal how the way that global 
poverty and global inequality are measured can distort our understanding of the 
complex changes in inequality between and within nations at a global level. 
Recognising and exposing the impact of these issues gives a rather less optimistic 
view of the impact of economic growth since the end of the Cold War on global 
inequality and poverty. 
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ANNEX: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
This paper makes use of a custom-built model of growth, inequality and poverty. 
Henceforth this model is referred to as the GrIP (‘Gr’owth, ‘I’nequality and 
‘P’overty) model (version 2.0, 2015). For an earlier version of the model (GrIP model 
v1.0) see Edward and Sumner (2014). The GrIP model includes extensive 
functionality to test the sensitivity of results to different datasets and different 
assumptions about how to handle the data. The descriptions provided in this paper 
relate only to the model as configured for the analysis presented in this paper and 
should not be assumed to apply to the way the model is configured in other published 
analyses based on the GrIP model. For this paper we have configured GrIP to align 
with the overall approach used by the World Bank when producing poverty estimates 
through PovcalNet. This means that our approach here is to combine survey 
distributions with survey (rather than national account) means and to rely wherever 
possible on data in Povcal in preference to other sources, on the basis that data in 
Povcal has already been selected for reliability and robustness through scrutiny of 
available competing survey datasets. This does not mean that GrIP replicates Povcal 
calculations because there are a number of additional adjustments in GrIP, rather that 
they are included to develop a truly global distribution that can allow reasonable 
comparison across time periods. Principal among these are: the use of other sources 
and methods to add in estimates for countries where data is not available in Povcal; 
the way that underlying survey data is interpolated between surveys; and the use of 
changes in national account data to inform scaling of survey means (mean per capita 
consumption) between surveys. We describe these adjustments briefly below but, 
because they were originally introduced in earlier versions of GrIP after careful 
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consideration and evaluation, we would refer the reading to earlier discussions (such 
as Edward and Sumner, 2014) where much more detail can be found. In this paper we 
also introduce two new additional measures namely the adjustment of income-based 
surveys to align more consistently with consumption-based surveys, and an 
adjustment to estimate the possible impact of top income earners who are often 
missed from surveys. These are new adjustments thus we discuss them in more detail. 
The core approach in the GrIP model is to take for each country the 
distribution (quintile and decile) data and, by combining this with data on national 
population and on the mean consumption per capita in internationally comparable 
PPP $, develop for each country an estimate of how many people live at any specific 
consumption ($-a-day) level. Having identified for each country the number of people 
living at each consumption level, the GrIP model then aggregates these to build a 
global distribution of how many people live, and how much those people consume, at 
every consumption level from the poorest to the richest in the world and a wide 
variety of sub-global aggregations are also readily produced. These aggregations are 
then interrogated to investigate issues such as poverty levels, trends in inequality and 
who are the absolute or relative winners and losers from global growth. 
 
Table A1 Core components of the GrIP v2.0 model and data sources 
Variables Source and date of update 
Survey distributions, survey means PovcalNet, 8 Oct 2014 
HFCE and GDP in 2011 PPP, population 
headcounts, additional survey distributions 
WDI, 17 Oct 2014 
Additional survey distributions WIID3b, Sept 2014 
Population growth forecasts UNPD World Population Prospects (WPP) 
2012 (medium forecast) 
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Table A1 shows the data sources for the GrIP v2.0. As table A1 shows the GrIP v2.0 
is built from data in the World Bank’s PovcalNet, World Development Indicators, 
UNU WIDER’s WIID3b and UNPD World Population Prospects.   
 Throughout this paper we use the new PPP rates (for 2011). While we 
acknowledge that significant uncertainties remain concerning this data (for a 
discussion of these issues see Edward and Sumner, 2015), nevertheless we use them 
because we recognise that they are generally thought to be the best available data and 
superior to previous PPP data (Deaton and Aten, 2014).  
 Distributions (quintile and upper and lower decile data) are taken (in this order 
of preference) from PovcalNet, World Development Indicators or the UNU WIID 
database. Survey data has improved considerably in recent years and notably there are 
now many more surveys to draw data from and far fewer ‘gaps’ for specific countries. 
However, there are still some significant gaps in the data. Surveys do not take place 
annually so, in the GrIP model, distributions for intermediate years, between-surveys 
are calculated by interpolation, while in years subsequent to the most recent survey 
the distribution is assumed to remain unchanged from that survey. We note also that 
the distribution data can be derived at either the individual level or the household 
level. This is an outcome of the original survey design and so it is difficult to adjust 
for in subsequent analysis. As is the case for most other studies we do not attempt to 
adjust for this difference but note that household surveys will inevitably understate 
national inequality to some extent as they do not include intra-household inequality. 
To ensure optimum coverage of the global population, where a country has no 
surveys, or the gaps between surveys are too great to allow reliable interpolation, the 
GrIP model ‘fills’ a country’s missing distributions with the (not population-
weighted) average distribution from all other countries in the same region and income 
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group (in contrast, the World Bank poverty estimates are based on ‘filling’ with 
regional averages regardless of average income. See for details Ferreira et al., 2015).  
 The GrIP v2.0 model (as configured for this paper) calculates the number of 
people in each country at each different consumption level by combining survey 
distributions with measures of mean per capita consumption. The model then 
disaggregates these national populations into globally standard ‘$ per capita’ brackets, 
thereby avoiding introducing the distortions of approaches, such as Bhalla’s simple 
accounting procedure (Bhalla, 2002; Hillebrand, 2008) where by disaggregating to 
percentiles some large step-change distortions are introduced in the later global 
aggregation at points where percentiles from the very largest countries (such as India 
and China where each percentile currently includes well over 10 million people) are 
added back into the global distribution. In earlier versions of the GrIP model a linear 
distribution algorithm was used that accurately replicates the consumption level in 
each fractile in the source data. This works well in the lower fractiles where poverty 
headcounts are estimated, but at the higher end of the distribution (typically the upper 
quintile: the highest consuming 20%). While it accurately reproduces the totals of 
these top two deciles it does so at the expense of significant oversimplification of the 
large variations in inequality within those deciles. In the GrIP v2.0 model the 
generalised quadratic (GQ) algorithm, as described by Datt (1998), has also been 
incorporated. Arguably, this algorithm can replicate better the inequality distribution 
within the highest deciles so, in this paper, we use the GQ algorithm throughout. 
 Changes in consumption mean between survey years are derived by 
combining year-on-year changes in Household Final Consumption Expenditure 
(HFCE) from national account (NA) data with changes in the country-specific ratio of 
HFCE per capita means and survey-based means (the NA/S ratio) in survey years. We 
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have previously used GrIP to explore the impact of different approaches and 
assumptions in the use of the available data. For example, Edward and Sumner (2014) 
compare NA and survey means with reference to global and regional poverty 
estimates and discuss how the use of NA means makes substantial difference to 
estimates of global poverty and global inequality. Edward and Sumner (2015) 
compare 2005 and 2011PPPs. We do this here to remain comparable to the reference 
literature (such as poverty estimates published by the World Bank). Where reliable 
survey means are not available (for example when filling countries for which there is 
no survey data or when using distributions from WDI where survey means are not 
provided), an appropriate survey mean is estimated for that country based on its 
average per capita consumption level. To do this we use the following relationship, 
derived from the consumption surveys in PovcalNet:  
 
(
𝑁𝐴
𝑆
)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= (𝐻𝐹𝐶𝐸 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝛼 
 
The question of how national account means correlate with survey means has long 
been considered problematic, see for example: (Altimir, 1987; Mejía and Vos, 1997; 
Ravallion, 2003; Deaton, 2001). Karshenas (2003) identifies that a systemic 
relationship appears to exist between NA and survey means but that this is subject to 
considerable variation between countries. For this reason in GrIP we use country-
specific NA/S ratios wherever possible and include estimates generalised from global 
data only where necessary. A fuller description of our approach has been provided 
elsewhere (Edward, 2006; Edward and Sumner, 2014) although recent increases in 
available data mean that in GrIP v2.0 we have improved the method of estimation by 
introducing the regression relationship described here. We estimate that α = 0.052. 
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Table A2 illustrates how by first incorporating survey data from sources other 
than PovcalNet and then filling estimates for countries without usable survey data, the 
GrIP model incrementally builds a global model of consumption distribution.  
 
Table A2 Coverage of population and HFCE in GrIP v2.0 before and after filling (2011PPP) 
 
 2011 PPP 
No. of 
countries 
Global 
population 
included (%) 
Global 
HFCE 
included 
(%) 
PovcalNet coverage    
1990 110 88.1 82.5 
2012 111 86.9 77.3 
Process 1: additional distributions from WDI 
and WIID 
   
1990 130 94.0 97.3 
2012 145 94.6 96.5 
Process 2: filling with estimates for countries 
with no survey data 
   
1990 175 96.8 100.6 
2012 192 98.1 100.8 
Source: GrIP v2.0. Note: Process 2 figures for HFCE coverage exceed 100 per cent because the WDI 
2011 PPP figure for global total HFCE is actually slightly lower than the sum of the HFCE figures for 
the individual countries. 
 
GrIP v2.0 incorporates two important developments compared to v1.0. These are: the 
introduction of an adjustment of income-based surveys to render them more 
comparable to consumption-based surveys; and an adjustment to estimate the effect of 
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top income earners who are often missed from national consumption or income 
surveys. 
 It is widely recognised that there is likely to be a systematic difference 
between measures of consumption distribution and those of income distribution. In 
World Bank calculations where there has been the option of choosing either an 
income or consumption-based set of measures (i.e. distribution data and matching 
mean) there has been a preference for using consumption-based measures. While an 
argument can be made that this is because poverty-lines are nominally translatable 
into actual consumption (of food, shelter etc) and so consumption levels are a better 
reflection of an individual’s welfare, the more compelling explanation is generally 
that, among those at the bottom of the distribution, measures of income can be less 
reliable due to under-reporting or mis-recognition of informal incomes or the value of 
self-produced incomes (such as directly consumed agricultural produce). For these 
sorts of reasons, World Bank analysts have tended to prefer using consumption 
measures (see discussion of Lipton and Ravallion, 1995) and in the spirit of mirroring 
(but not directly replicating) the Povcal approach, we do likewise here. 
 Until recently, however, most analyses of global poverty and inequality 
(including, but not only, earlier versions of the GrIP model) have not made any 
adjustment for systemic differences between consumption- based and income-based 
measures, opting instead merely to use consumption-based measures whenever a 
direct choice is available. A key pragmatic reason why this adjustment has been often 
omitted is because within PovcalNet there is only a rather limited set of countries 
where equivalent data (i.e. from the same country and same year) is provided on both 
an income and a consumption basis, and from which therefore a suitable comparison 
and adjustment could be developed. This comparison has now become more feasible 
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with the latest update of WIID, which contains a much larger number of paired 
income and consumption surveys, so we are now able to introduce this adjustment. 
 The paper of Deininger and Squire (1996) was one of the first to estimate 
adjustments for consumption to income measures. Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2014, p.11) 
suggest adding 7.8 points to the consumption Gini though 6.6 lies within the 95 per 
cent confidence interval of their estimate. More recently, and using the latest WIID, 
Lahoti et al. (2014) identify 120 instances in the WIID data set where there are both 
consumption and income distributions reported by the same statistical agency in the 
same year for a country. From these they estimate conversion factors to transform 
quintile data based on income metrics to consumption-equivalent values. We have not 
repeated their calculations; instead, we have used the more limited set of PovcalNet 
data to develop comparable estimates (see Table A3). In Table A3, estimate ‘a’ is 
derived from pairs of income and consumption surveys made in the same year. 
Estimate ‘b’ pairs income surveys with consumption surveys made within one year of 
each other.  
Despite using a much more limited data set, these estimates broadly confirm 
figures from Lahoti et al. (2014) and demonstrate that (as one would expect) 
consumption distributions are less unequal with a higher proportion of the distribution 
accruing to the lower fractiles. In this paper we have adopted the Lahoti et al. 
adjustments (because they are derived from a much larger data set) and supplemented 
them by our own estimate (derived from estimates ‘a’ and ‘b’) for the lowest and 
highest deciles, as these are not stated by Lahoti et al. We would note though that a 
substantial degree of uncertainty remains over this relationship (see discussion in 
Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).   
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Table A3 Conversion multipliers for adjusting income survey data 
 
 Estimate ‘a’ 
 
Source: PovcalNet 
Estimate ‘b’ 
 
Source: PovcalNet 
Estimate ‘c’ 
 
Source: Lahoti et 
al. (2014) 
No. of matched surveys in sample 25 39 120 
No. of countries in sample 8 15 Not stated 
Decile 1 (D1) 1.399 1.598 1.386 * 
Quintile 1 (Q1) 1.196 1.318 1.185 
Quintile 2 (Q2) 1.045 1.091 1.150 
Quintile 3 (Q3) 1.030 1.048 1.120 
Quintile 4 (Q4) 1.014 1.011 1.060 
Quintile 5 (Q5) 0.966 0.936 0.860 
Decile 10 (D10) 0.955 0.919 0.851 * 
Note: * = data estimated by authors. Source: Authors’ estimates based on GrIP v2.0 and Lahoti et al. 
(2014).  
 
Applying these multipliers to a country’s decile/quintile figures (if the original data is 
based on income measures) adjusts the income-based distributions in the model to 
make them more comparable to consumption-based measures. However, these 
systemic differences are not limited to the distribution curves. There is also a 
systematic difference between income-based means and consumption-based means 
with income measured in the surveys being on average larger than consumption 
measured in the surveys (see, for example, Karshenas, 2003, 691) so that an 
adjustment also needs to be made to reduce the income aggregate (or mean) to render 
it comparable to consumption” aggregates. We address this by revisiting the 
calculation of the NA/S to HFCE relationship (discussed above) but this time we use 
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only income surveys (whereas previously it was calculated using only consumption 
surveys). This allows us to use all the surveys in PovcalNet (of which over 500 are 
income based and over 600 are consumption based as opposed to the much more 
limited set of fewer than 40 paired income and consumption surveys) to estimate a 
relationship between consumption and income based NA/S ratios as follows (We 
estimate the factor ncome based:  
 
(
𝑁𝐴
𝑆
)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= (
𝑁𝐴
𝑆
)
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
× (𝐻𝐹𝐶𝐸 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝛽 
 
All results presented in this paper include this adjustment of income surveys to 
consumption equivalents. Although intuitively one would expect income-based means 
to be larger than consumption-based means, the reasons are complex and are different 
depending, for example, on where an individual is on the distribution. For further 
discussion see Deaton (2005) who analyses the issue in detail and Altimir (1987) who 
discusses some of the complexity inherent to different approaches to income surveys 
and the difficulties encountered in trying to disaggregate and account for individual 
elements of this complexity. For these reasons, here we follow Lahoti et al. (2014) in 
deriving generalised adjustment factors from the aggregated data that can be applied 
to bring income-based measures more closely into alignment with consumption-based 
measures than has been standard practice in the past. 
 It has long been recognised that the consumption (or income) of the top of the 
distribution is not well captured in the household survey data (see for discussion, 
Korinek et al., 2006). More recently, data from the Paris School of Economics’ Top 
Incomes Project (TIP) (which is based on taxation data, see Alvaredo et al., 2014) has 
drawn attention to concerns that the ‘missing’ share of the distribution that accrues to 
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the top percentiles can be substantial. Various methods have been proposed recently 
to take account of this. Some scholars have attempted to adjust for ‘top incomes’ by 
assuming that discrepancies between survey and HFCE data are entirely due to 
underreporting by the richest (e.g. Lakner and Milanovic, 2013). Others (e.g. Anand 
and Segal, 2015) develop assumptions on the missing ‘top incomes’ by drawing on 
the TIP data produced by Alvaredo et al. (2014). More commonly, the issue has been 
expediently ignored on the basis that if one is only concerned with estimating poverty 
levels then the problem of ‘missing’ consumption of the richest is largely incidental 
because it occurs at the top of the country distributions and so generally well above 
the poverty lines under consideration.  
 However, the issue could make a difference when considering the entire 
global consumption distribution, as we do here, so in the GrIP v2.0 model we use the 
TIP dataset to develop a relationship between the share of the top decile (10%) from 
national distribution surveys and the reported shares in TIP (from tax data) of the top 
fractiles, i.e. the top decile (10%), ventile (5%) and percentile (1%). We use the most 
recent surveys from each country in TIP where there is both a matching income-based 
survey in PovcalNet and data in TIP. This yields 17 datapoints (all of which are from 
high-income countries) from which we derive linear relationships to estimate- the 
unadjusted top decile share in the survey distributions in GrIP, and revised shares of 
the top decile, ventile and percentile in each country. The data in GrIP is then adjusted 
by adding consumption appropriately across the top decile in every country to bring 
the shares of the top fractiles in line with these estimated revised shares. Recognising, 
however, that the HFCE figure probably provides an upper limit to the amount of 
consumption that should reasonably be added, we cap the adjustment so that the total 
consumption for each country does not exceed its HFCE total. There are some 
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exceptions to this where the PovcalNet survey mean already implies a consumption 
level higher than the HFCE total. In those cases we reason that the HFCE figures 
must be questionable and so do not apply the cap. 
This adjustment does not have any impact on the absolute consumption of those 
below the top decile in each country. It simply adds consumption to the top 10 per 
cent in each country and distributes this so as to reproduce, in GrIP’s consumption-
based analysis, the same share of the distribution that the TIP database identifies for 
and among the top 10 per cent. In practice, however, the share of the rich in a 
consumption survey will probably be lower than this as rich people tend not to save 
more and consume less, as a proportion of their annual income, than do the poor. For 
these reasons we consider that the top incomes adjustment in GrIP may overstate the 
share of consumption that is accounted for by the richest decile in each country. We 
therefore present estimates with and without top income adjustment on the basis that 
such estimates might be best viewed as the range of possibilities not that one or the 
other is more ‘correct’.  
